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ARE THE RECORDS OF MENTAL HOSPITALS PRIVILEGED
IN MENTAL INCOMPETENCY ADJUDICATIONS?

I. Introduction.
This article will deal with the use as evidence of hospital records when
they are offered as hearsay evidence1 of the matters recorded, namely, the
diagnostic findings.of the examining physician or psychiatrist as to the mental
incompetency of the patient. 2 Particular emphasis will be placed on the
situation in Wyoming. Because the entries involve hearsay and lie in an
area of expert opinion, numerous problems are presented, including questions
of whether the patient is voluntary or involuntary, paying or non-paying, and
whether the hospital is public or private. As exceptions to the hearsay rule,
both the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act 3 (hereafter called the
4
Business Entries Act) and the Uniform Official Reports as Evidence Act
(hereinafter called the Official Entries Act) must be considered in the light of
the Physician-Patient Privilege Statute. 5
The term "hospital records" in general means the records and charts
kept as a part of the case history of all patients in a mental hospital. They
are usually made by psychatrists,0 other doctors, and nurses who at various
times enter on these records items pertaining to the care or progress of the
patient, or the evaluation of his mental condition. It is obvious that such a
record, if offered as evidence without calling all of the individuals who made
the notations or entries, is hearsay and is inadmissible unless it can be brought
under an exception to the hearsay rule. 7 We shall first discuss the admissibility of hospital records in general, then narrow the discussion to the records
of mental hospitals.

I.

Hospital Records Admitted Under the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act.

The hearsay exception which admits business entries is built upon the
basic assumption that records kept in the regular course of business are
generally accurate and may therefore be used in case of necessity as evidence
However, as McCormick has pointed out,
of the truth of matters recorded.'
courts have been slow to extend the principle of this exception to such non1. McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 225 (1954):

"Hearsay evidence is testimony in court

or written evidence of a statement made out of court .
show the truth of matters asserted therein . . ."

. .

offered as an assertion to

2. For a general discussion, see Hale, Hospital Records as Evidence, 14 So. Calif. L.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

Rev. 99 (1941).
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 1-172 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 1-166 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 1.139 (1957).
A psychiaSan Francisco vs. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P. 2d 26 (1951).
trist is generally recognized as an individual who is licensed to practice general medicine and who has had such additional training in the field of mental disorders as
is deemed sufficient by a hospital for admission to practice therein, or is deemed sufficient by the American Board of Psychiatry for admission to its membership rolls.
Annot. 169 A.L.R. 670 (1947).
McCormick, Evidence Sec. 290 (1954).

[59]
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commercial establishments as hospitals. Thus, in some instances, it has been
necessary to resort to the hearsay exception for official statements (to be
later discussed) to get into evidence records of public hospitals or the hospital records required by law." Many states have special statutes regulating
the admission of hospital records.1" Wyoming, having no such specific statute,
must rely on more general statutes together with the common law hearsay
exceptions to justify the introduction of hospital records as evidence.
In order for hospital records to be admissible under the common law
exception of entries in regular course of business, it is essential that they
First, they must be made contemporsatisfy three probative requirements."
aneously with he acts to which they purport to relate. Second, there must have
been present at the time no contemplative motive for falsification. And, third,
they must have been made by a person having knowledge of the facts set
forth or one competent to predicate a medical and scientific opinion of the
facts. It has been said that most courts would today permit hospital records
to be admitted upon the same conditions of meeting the requirements of
regularity, personal knowlege, contemporaneousness, production of participants
12
and the like, as are prescribed for business records.
Wyoming has adopted the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. 13
The term "business" is defined14 to include "every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions whether carried on for
profit or not." This statute embodies a definition of business so broad as to
leave no doubt that hospital records come within its terms, thus simplifying
15
and modernizing the requirements for the admission of business entries.
Hence, it is no longer necessary that a Wyoming court reply upon the common
law business entries exception to justify the admissibility of hospital records.

III.

Hospital Records Admitted Under the Public Documents or Official
Entries Act.

1
Wyoming in 1941 adopted the Uniform Official Reports as Evidence Act "
which provides in Section 1-166 that "written reports or findings of fact made
by officers of this state on a matter within the scope of their duty as defined by
statute shall insofar as relevant be admitted as evidence of matters stated
therein."

The public documents or official statements exception to the hearsay
rule is growing rapidly.' T This exception involves a record made by a public
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Ibid.
These are compiled in 6 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 1707 (3d ed. 1940L
32 C.J.S- Evidence Sec. 728 (1942).
32 C.J.S. Evidence Sec. 728 (1942).
Wyo. Stat. 1-170 to 1-173 (1957).

14.

Wyo. Stat. 1-171 (1957).

15. McCormick, The Use of Hospital Records as Evidence, 26 Tulane L. Rev. p. 373
(1952).
16. Wyo. Stat. Sec. 1-165 to 1-169 (1957).
17. Braham, Case Records of Hospitals and Doctors as Evidence Under the Business Records Act; 21 Temple L. Quart. 113 (1948).
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official who is under a duty to record the event or condition. A written statement of a public official which he had a duty to make is admissible as evidence of the facts recorded.'" Most hospital records are kept under direction
of law. But, the obvious limitation is that at common law this exception does
not apply to hospitals conducted as private institutions, unless the proponent
can point to some statute requiring private hospitals to keep the kind of
records he is offering.'
The Wyoming Statutes provide that the "superintendent of the (State Mental Hospital) . . . shall cause to be kept a fair and
full account of all his doings 20 indicating among other things that medical
records shall be kept. Wyoming also requires that " . . . the superintendent
of the hospital shall, within ten days after the admission of such patient, forward to the office of the board, a record of such patient .. .,,2
A report on
the admission of each patient must also be filed.22 The above provisions of
the statutes would seem to indicate that there is a duty imposed upon the
superintendent to keep such records pertaining to the individuals admitted,
regardless of whether they are voluntary or involuntary patients. It follows
that these records would come within the official statements exception to the
hearsay rule and would be admitted as prima facie evidence of the facts therein.
The admissibility of hospital records as either business records or as
official reports may violate the privilege for communications between a patient
and his physician, - ' and this problem will next be discussed.

IV.

Physician-PatientPrivilege.

In states such as Wyoming which recognizes the physician-patient privilege,
hospital records may be excluded from evidence because of the privilege. A
court in the District of Columbia held under a statute similar to Wyoming's
that the information obtained by a psychiatrist of a public mental hospital
while attending an inmate comes within the provisions of the statute and
24
makes such confidential information inadmissible.
The object of the statute making communcations between physicians and
patients privileged is not primarily to disqualify the physician from testifying,
but rather to enable the patient to secure medical aid without betrayal of confidence. '-5 ' The patient may, however, waive objection and permit the physician
to testify. In other words, the privilege is the privilege of the patient and
not the physician; if the patient assents, the court will compel the physician
to answer, or allow the hospital records prepared by the physician in evidence. 20
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

5 Wigmore Evidence Sec. 1639 (3d. ed. 1940).
26 Tulane L. Rev. p. 371 (1952).
Jordan v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d 237 (Ky., 1952).
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 25-639 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 25-40 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 1-139 (1957).
Taylor vs. U.S. 222 F. 2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See also 54 Mich L. Rev. 424 (1956).
8 Wigmore, Evidence, See 2 380a (3d. ed. 1940).
Wolf vs. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P. 2d 926, 927 (1947).
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Apart from questions of waiver, other factors considered are the extent
to which the privilege is affected by the presence of third persons and the
extent to which third persons gain knowledge through regular routine participation in, or access to, the hospital records. Since this privilege is purely
of statutory origin, 27 the problem is one of statutory wording, and interpretation. The courts have taken two distinct attitudes with reference to the
construction of such statutes. Some courts have held that such statutes are
remedial in their nature and should be liberally construed, while others have
taken the view that they are in derogation of the common law and should be
strictly construed. 28 It often happens in hospitals that third persons are
present during the otherwise confidential communications. These persons
are usually nurses, interns, psychologists or other staff members.
The general rule seems to be that this privilege applies only to physician
and patient and does not include a third person who might be present, unless
such third person is aiding the physician, or is necessary as a means of
communication between physician and patient. 2 The Wyoming Statute requires that the practitioner be a licensed physician.30 Although the act would
encompass the psychiatrist, since he is an individual who is licensed to practice
medicine, 3 ' it is probable that the court would not extend the privilege to
include a clinical psychologist who does not normally have a license to practice
medicine, but who is recognized as qualified in the treatment of mental disorders, and in the testing and evaluation of persons who are mentally ill or
insane. The functions of clinical psychologists and their relations to patients
or inmates are nearly identical to those of the psychiatrist. Therefore, if the
privilege is to include the psychiatrist, should it be construed to encompass
the psychologist? Sound reasoning would seem to dictate that the requirement of a license to pracice medicine for inclusion within the privilege should
not be extended to psychologists, unless their work is done under the immediate
direction of a licensed physician.
Distinctions are made between the case where the patient is examined
only as to his mental fitness,3 2 and the case where he is treated for mental
illness. 33 In the former, the communications are not privileged because the
purpose of the usual doctor-patient relationship, the seeking of treatment, is
not present. In these situations communications to clinical psychologists
would not be privileged.
When the patient is committed for examination only, the issue of the
statute's applicability relates to the broad question of whether the necessary
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

McCormick, Evidence See 101 (1954).
Annot. 107 A.L.R. 1491 (1937).
Mullin-Johnson Co. vs. Pennsylvania. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 2 Fed. Supp. 203, 204
(D.C. Cal. 1933).
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 1-139 (1957).
47 N.W. Univ. L. Rev. 384 (1952).
Hopkins vs. State 212 Miss. 772, 55 So. (2d) 467 (1951). See also Annot. 107 A.L.R.
1491 (1937).
Lincott vs. Hughbanks 140 Kan. 353 37 P.2d 26 (1934).
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relationship exists between a state hospital psychiatrist and a committed inmate. 34 The Wyoming Supreme Court in a recent decision 5 has shed some
light upon this area. The defendant, accused of murder, had been committed
by court order to the state hospital and to a private physician for examinations
to determine whether he was sane. Later at the trial it was contended by the
defendant's counsel that the communications by the defendant to the physicians
who testified for the state were privileged. The court held that "there is no
merit in that contention," pointing out that these physicians were not the personal physicians of the defendant, but physicians employed to find out whether
the defendant was sane or insane, and thus his communication to them was
not privileged, and they could properly testify for the state. It can be concluded from this decision that whenever an individual is committed by court
order to the state hospital or to a physician for an examination merely to
determine his sanity, the communication will not come within the doctorpatient privilege. This conclusion is in harmony with respected authorities
who take the view that in criminal insanity cases policy may dictate that the
3 4
privilege be lifted in order to permit the better administration of justice.
An opposite result would occur where the patient is committed for
treatment rather than examination. Since the physician or psychiatrist must
encourage the patient to divulge his innermost thoughts, his statements to
3 7
Acthe physician-therapist should fall within the protection of the statute.
to
communications
applies
cordingly, most courts have held that the privilege
38
between public hospital physicians and patients committed for treatment.
This seems to be true in civil as well as criminal proceedings where there is
a question of the patient's sanity. A civil case decidedly in point (which
goes even beyond the decision of the Wyoming court) held that doctors could
not, over the objection of the patient or the patient's personal representative,
testify about anything found by them on examination of the patient at state
hospital for the insane.3 9 It is interesting to note, however, that in the same
case the court held that where the question of the mental soundness of a person
is at issue, a non-expert who has had an opportunity to observe the person
may state his opinion as to the mental soundness of the person, having first
40
given the facts upon which his opinion is based.
The question arises as to whether the otherwise privileged character of
the records may be overridden by their public nature. Although, it is uni54 Mich. L. Rev. 424 (1956).
State vs. Riggle 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349 (1956). See also Fisher vs. Small 166 A
2d. 744. and Garska vs. Harris 109825N.W. 2d 520.
(3d ed. 1940), 45 A.L.R. 1357 (1926, 2 A.L.R.
36. 8 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2385 p.
(2d) 647 (1948) ; these references include other situations where the privilege is
denied for policy reasons.
37. 54 Mich. L. Rev. 425 (1956).
34.
35.

38.
39.

See for example McGrath vs. State 104 N.Y.S. 2d. 882 (1950).
Lincott vs. Hughbanks 140 Kan. 353, 37 P.2d 26 (1934).

40. Ibid.
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versally agreed that the physicians entries are included in medical records
of a hospital, query whether the privilege should include the records of a state
hospital where the medical character of the records is overridden by the
public nature of the books. 41 A Mississippi court has held that it was erroneous
for the lower court to exclude as privileged the testimony of physicians based
on the records of a hospital for the insane which was required by law to make
and keep a record of the patients. 42 The opinion stated that the privileged
communications statute does not apply to cases where the law itself requires
the disclosure of the condition of the patient. This decision is in accord with
43
several other decisions in this area.
V.

Conclusion.

In viewing the overall picture today, the prevailing view appears to be
that where the court order is solely for the examination of the patient, the
diagnostic findings of qualified physicians (who are usually psychiatrists),
no matter how difficult and debatable the inferences to be drawn from the data
presented may be, are admissible in evidence when embodied in hospital records to the same extent that they would be received if the expert were personally present on the stand. However, in the situation where the patient is
or has been admitted for treatment, and the records of this treatment are later
offered in a proceeding which seeks a finding of the mental competency of the
patient, the records will not be admissible unless there is a waiver by the patient or his personal representative. The first conclusion is representative of
the growing recognition by courts of the value and importance of hospital records as aids to the court in the investigation of medical facts, while through
the second conclusion the court recognizes the importance to the patient of securing medical aid without revelation of his confidences.
In light of the severe criticism to which the physician-patient privilege
is currently being subjected it is time for the legislature to review the various
statutes which bear on the problem, at least-as far as they apply to inmates of
state hospitals and of state hospital psychiatrists and psychologists.
JOHN VIDAKOVICH

41.
42.
43.

8 Wigmore Sec. 2382 P. 820 (3d ed. 1940).
Morley vs. State 174 Miss. 568, 165 So. 296 (1936).
Marx vs. Parks 39 SW (2d) 270 Tenn. (1931).
Wills vs Nat. Life and Acc. 162
N.E. 822 Ohio (1928).

